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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
MICHAEL J. HAWK, DONALD M.
HILL, and JAYE M. JACKSON
Plaintiffs,
v.

STEVEN ODOM and
MARTIN KIDDER
Defendants.
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ORDER
On July 1, 2009, Counsel appeared before this Court to present oral argument on Defendant
Odom's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Kidder's Motion for Summary Judgment.
After hearing the arguments made by counsel and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motions and
the record in the case, the Court finds as follows:
I.

Facts
This case arises out of a private placement offering ("the Transaction") through which

Plaintiffs purchased stock in Verso Technologies, Inc. ("Verso"), a Minnesota corporation that is
currently in bankruptcy. Defendant Steven A. Odom ("Odom") was the CEO of Verso, and Defendant
Martin Kidder ("Kidder") was the CFO of Verso.
On February 21, 2008, each Plaintiff executed a subscription agreement memorializing their
purchase of Verso stock. Plaintiffs' representative for this transaction was Mr. Donald J. Slowinski
("Slowinksi"). Prior to Plaintiffs' purchase of Verso stock, Slowinski met with Odom and was the sole
conduit of information between Odom and Plaintiffs regarding this Transaction. During their meeting,
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Odom gave Slowinski a PowerPoint presentation about Verso that Plaintiffs allege contains material
misrepresentations.
Plaintiffs filed this action asserting claims for common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and securities fraud under Georgia law. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that (1) Odom made material
misrepresentations and omissions regarding Verso to Slowinski who passed this misinformation on to
Plaintiffs, and that (2) Kidder sent Plaintiffs subscription agreements which were misleading in light of
information that Kidder failed to disclose.

II.

Standard
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to o.e.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the

moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of
law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The moving party need only eliminate
one essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary judgment. Real Estate Int'l Inc. v.
Buggah, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996).

III.

Kidder's Motion for Summary Judgment
The record shows that Kidder's only involvement

III

the Transaction was to forward

subscription agreements to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs concede that Kidder made no misrepresentations to
them, or to Slowinski, and that the subscription agreements did not contain any misrepresentations.
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs' claims against Kidder rest on alleged omissions only.
Kidder argues that he had no duty to disclose information to Plaintiffs and, thus, Plaintiffs'
fraud claims against him fail as a matter oflaw.
Actionable fraud may be based on "[s]uppression of a material fact which a party is under an
obligation to communicate." O.C.G.A. § 23-2-53. "The obligation to communicate may arise from the
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confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." Id. Plaintiffs do
not dispute that they have never shared a confidential relationship with Kidder. Moreover, Plaintiffs
have not established circumstances in this case that would impart to Kidder a duty to disclose. "Absent
a confidential relationship, no duty to disclose exists between parties in arms-length business
transactions." Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 241, 244 (2007); see also, Bogle v. Bragg, 248
Ga. App. 632, 636 (2001). The record reveals that this case arises from an arms-length business
transaction.
Defendant Kidder's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.
IV.

Odom's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs' claims against Odom are based on both misrepresentations and omISSIOns.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the PowerPoint presentation they received regarding Verso contained
misrepresentations, and that the presentation was especially misleading in light of omissions of
information by Odom. Plaintiffs point to four specific omissions which, if known' to them prior to the
transactions, would have ended their interest in buying Verso stock. The four omissions cited by
Plaintiffs are: (1) Verso was at risk of receiving a "going concern" exception to its December 31, 2007
financial audit; (2) Verso was generally unable to pay its debts as they became due; (3) Verso was at
risk of losing its NASDAQ listing because of a failure to meet the minimum shareholders' equity
requirements; and (4) Verso had booked fictitious sales. In light of these alleged omissions, Plaintiffs
argue that it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether Odom represented that Verso was
merely struggling when it was, in fact, already dead on the vine.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Odom first argues that the merger clause
contained in the sUbscription agreement bars Plaintiffs' claims.

Specifically, the merger clause

numbered section 9 in the agreement, provides that "[t]his Subscription Agreement contains the entire
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agreement of the parties with respect to the matter set forth herein and there are no representations,
covenants or other agreements except as stated or referred to herein or as are embodied in the Offering
Documents."

There are only two documents involved in the Transaction: (1) the subscription

agreement and (2) the PowerPoint presentation about Verso which was given by Odom to Slowinski
and passed on to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the only offering document to which the merger clause refers is
the PowerPoint presentation.

As the merger clause incorporates into the Parties' agreement the

representations of the PowerPoint, the merger clause does not operate to bar Plaintiffs' claims based on
misrepresentations found in the PowerPoint, or information in the PowerPoint presentation which is
fraudulent in light of omitted information.
Next, Odom argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs cannot have
justifiably relied on Odom's representations.

In support of this argument, Odom maintains that

Slowinski's deposition testimony shows that he generally distrusted Odom, and that Slowinski's
general distrust of Odom must be imputed to Plaintiffs because Slowinski was their agent for this
Transaction.
Despite Odom's arguments, many questions of fact persist that preclude the grant of summary
judgment. Such questions of fact include: (1) whether plaintiffs relied on the representations made in
the PowePoint presentation and if such reliance was reasonable, (2) whether Odom knew at the time he
provided the PowerPoint presentation to Plaintiffs (through Slowinski) that Verso was on the brink of
bankruptcy, and (3) whether Slowinski was, in fact, an agent of Plaintiffs so that under Georgia law his
knowledge of the transactions and the player involved may be imputed to Plaintiffs.

4

Defendant Odom's motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

v.

Plaintiffs Offer of Rescission

In their First Amended and Restated Complaint, Plaintiffs offer rescission of the subscription
agreement as an alternative to damages. As Defendants are not parties to the sUbscription agreement
which was entered into between Plaintiffs and Verso only, rescission is not an available remedy.
Accordingly, this case shall proceed as one for damages only against Defendant Odom.

SO ORDERED this 10th day of July, 2009.

Copies to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mr. Jerry L. Sims, Esq.
Sims, Moss, Kline & Davis
Three Ravinia Drive, Suite 1700
Atlanta, GA 30346
Phone: 770-481-7200
Fax: 770-481-7210
Email: jlsims@smkdlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
Mr. John G. Despriet, Esq.
James E. Connelly, Esq.
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP
Promenade II, Suite 3100
1230 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-3592
Phone: 404-815-3500
Fax: 404-685-7030
Email: jdespriet@sgrlaw.com
jeconnelly@sgrlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Kidder
Nisbet S. Kendrick, Esq.
John G. Perry, Esq.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC
One Atlantic Center
1201 West Peachtree Street
Suite 3500
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3574
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(404) 888-7488
kkendrick@wcsr.com; jperry@wcsr.com
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